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Abstract
We investigate how to combine a number of marginal co-
herent sets of desirable gambles into a joint set using the
properties of epistemic irrelevance and independence. We
provide formulas for the smallest such joint, called their
independent natural extension, and study its main proper-
ties. The independent natural extension of maximal sets
of gambles allows us to define the strong product of sets
of desirable gambles. Finally, we explore an easy way to
generalise these results to also apply for the conditional
versions of epistemic irrelevance and independence.
Keywords. Epistemic irrelevance, epistemic independence,
independent natural extension, strong product, coherent set
of desirable gambles.
1 Introduction
One disadvantage of working with coherent lower previ-
sions (or previsions and probabilities for that matter), is
that conditioning a lower prevision does not necessarily
lead to uniquely coherent results when the conditioning
event has lower probability zero; see for instance Ref. [8,
Section 6.4]. For precise probabilities, this difficulty can
be circumvented by using full conditional measures [5]. In
an imprecise-probabilities context, working with the more
informative coherent sets of desirable gambles rather than
with lower previsions provides a very elegant and intuiti-
vely appealing way out of this problem, as Walley already
suggested in 1991 [8, Section 3.8.6 and Appendix F], and
argued in much more detail in 2000 [9]. The connection bet-
ween full conditional measures and maximal coherent sets
of desirable gambles was explored by Couso and Moral [1].
De Cooman and Quaeghebeur [4] have shown that working
with sets of desirable gambles is especially illuminating in
the context of modelling exchangeability assessments.
Exchangeability is a structural assessment, and so is inde-
pendence. Conditioning and independence are, of course,
closely related. In a recent paper [3], we investigated the no-
tions of epistemic independence of finite-valued variables
using coherent lower previsions. The above-mentioned pro-
blems with conditioning, and the fact that the coherence
requirements for conditional lower previsions are, to be
honest, quite cumbersome to work with, have turned this
into a quite complicated exercise. This is the reason why, in
the present paper, we investigate if looking at independence
using sets of desirable gambles leads to a more elegant
theory that avoids some of the complexity pitfalls of wor-
king with coherent lower previsions. In doing this, we build
on the strong pioneering work on epistemic irrelevance by
Moral [7]. While we focus here on the symmetrised notion
of epistemic independence, much of what we do can be
seen as an application and continuation of his ideas.
In Section 2 we summarise relevant results in the existing
theory of sets of desirable gambles. After mentioning useful
notational conventions in Section 3, we recall the basic
marginalisation, conditioning and extension operations for
sets of desirable gambles in Sections 4 and 5. We use these
to combine a number of marginal sets of desirable gambles
into a joint satisfying epistemic irrelevance (Section 6), and
epistemic independence (Section 7). In Section 8, we study
the particular case of maximal sets of desirable gambles,
and derive the concept of a strong product. Section 9 deals
with conditional independence assessments.
2 Coherent sets of desirable gambles and
natural extension
Consider a variable X taking values in some non-empty
setX , that we shall assume to be finite. We model infor-
mation about X by means of sets of desirable gambles. A
gamble is a real-valued function onX , and we denote the
set of all gambles onX by G (X). It is a linear space under
point-wise addition of gambles and point-wise multiplica-
tion of gambles with real numbers. For any subset A of
G (X), we denote by posi(A ) the set of all positive linear
combinations of gambles in A :
posi(A ) :=
{ n
∑
k=1
λk fk : fk ∈A, λk > 0, n> 0
}
.
We callA a convex cone if it is closed under positive linear
combinations, meaning that posi(A ) =A .
For any gambles f and g on X , we write ‘ f ≥ g’ if
(∀x ∈ X) f (x) ≥ g(x), and ‘ f > g’ if f ≥ g and f 6= g.
A gamble f > 0 is called positive. A gamble g≤ 0 is cal-
led non-positive. G (X)6=0 denotes the set of all non-zero
gambles, G (X)>0 the convex cone of all positive gambles,
and G (X)≤0 the convex cone of all non-positive gambles.
2.1 Coherence and avoiding non-positivity
Definition 1 ([4]). A set of desirable gambles D ⊆ G (X)
avoids non-positivity if G (X)≤0∩posi(D) = /0. It is called
coherent if:
D1. 0 /∈D;
D2. G (X)>0 ⊆D;
D3. D = posi(D).
We denote by D(X) the set of all coherent sets of desirable
gambles onX .
Requirement D3 turns D into a convex cone. Due to D2,
it includes G (X)>0; due to D1–D3, it excludes G (X)≤0,
and therefore avoids non-positivity.
2.2 Natural extension
If we consider any non-empty family of coherent sets of
desirable gambles Di, i ∈ I, then their intersection ⋂i∈IDi
is still coherent. This is the idea behind the following result.
If a subject gives us an assessment, a set A ⊆ G (X) of
gambles on X that he finds desirable, then we can tell
exactly when this assessment can be extended to a coherent
set, and how to construct the smallest such set.
Theorem 1 (Natural extension [4]). Consider an assess-
ment A ⊆ G (X), and define its natural extension as:1
E(A ) :=
⋂
{D ∈ D(X) : A ⊆D}
Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) A avoids non-positivity;
(ii) A is included in some coherent set of desirable
gambles;
(iii) E(A ) 6= G (X);
(iv) the set of desirable gambles E(A ) is coherent;
(v) E(A ) is the smallest coherent set of desirable gambles
that includes A .
When any (and hence all) of these equivalent statements
hold, then E(A ) = posi
(
G (X)>0∪A
)
.
2.3 Helpful lemmas
In order to prove a number of results in this paper, we need
the following lemmas, one of which is convenient version
1As usual, in this expression, we let
⋂
/0 = G (X ).
of the separating hyperplane theorem:
Lemma 2. Consider a finite subsetA of G (X). Then 0 /∈
posi(G (X)>0∪A ) if and only if there is some probability
mass function p such that ∑x∈X p(x) f (x)> 0 for all f ∈
A and p(x)> 0 for all x ∈X .
Proof. It clearly suffices to prove necessity. Since 0 /∈
posi(G (X)>0 ∪A ), we infer from a version of the separating
hyperplane theorem [8, Appendix E.1] that there is a linear func-
tional Λ on G (X) such that
(∀x ∈X)Λ(I{x})> 0 and (∀ f ∈A )Λ( f )> 0.
Then Λ(X) = ∑x∈X Λ(I{x}) > 0, and if we let p(x) :=
Λ(I{x})/Λ(X) > 0 for all x ∈X , then p is a probability mass
function onX for which Λ( f )/Λ(X) =∑x∈X p(x) f (x)> 0 for
all f ∈A . 
Lemma 3. Consider a convex cone A of gambles onX
such that max f > 0 for all f ∈A . Consider any non-zero
gamble g onX . If g /∈A then 0 /∈ posi(A ∪{−g}).
Proof. Consider a non-zero gamble g /∈ A , and assume ex ab-
surdo that 0 ∈ posi(A ∪{−g}). Then it follows from the assump-
tions that there are f ∈ A and µ > 0 such that 0 = f + µ(−g).
Hence g ∈A , a contradiction. 
2.4 Maximal sets of desirable gambles
An elementD ofD(X) is called maximal if it is not strictly
included in any other element of D(X), or in other words,
if adding any gamble f to D makes sure we can no longer
extend the set D∪{ f} to a set that is still coherent:
(∀D ′ ∈ D(X))(D ⊆D ′⇒D =D ′)
M(X) denotes the set of all maximal elements of D(X).
The following proposition provides a characterisation of
such maximal elements.
Proposition 4 ([1, 4]). Let D ∈ D(X), then D is a maxi-
mal coherent set of desirable gambles if and only if
(∀ f ∈ G (X)6=0)( f /∈D⇒− f ∈D).
For the following important result, it is easy to provide a
constructive proof, based on the same ideas as in Ref. [1].
For the more general case of infiniteX , a non-constructive
proof can be based on Zorn’s Lemma [4].
Theorem 5 ([1, 4]). A subset A of G (X) avoids non-
positivity if and only if m(A ) := {M ∈M(X) : A ⊆M}
is non-empty. Moreover, E(A ) =
⋂
m(A ).
2.5 Coherent lower previsions
Given a coherent set of desirable gambles D, the functional
P defined on G (X) by
P( f ) := sup{µ : f −µ ∈D} (1)
is a coherent lower prevision [8, Theorem 3.8.1], and there-
fore corresponds to taking a lower envelope of expectations
with respect a set of probability mass functions. Many dif-
ferent coherent sets of desirable gambles induce the same
coherent lower prevision P. The smallest is called the asso-
ciated set of strictly desirable gambles:
D ′ := { f ∈ G (X) : f > 0 or P( f )> 0} . (2)
When D is a maximal coherent set of desirable gambles,
the lower prevision P defined by Eq. (1) is a linear previ-
sion, meaning that it corresponds to an expectation operator
with respect to a probability mass function. For more in-
formation, see Refs. [1, Section 5], [6, Proposition 6], [8]
and [10].
3 Basic notation
From now on we consider a number of variables Xn, n ∈ N,
taking values in the respective finite sets Xn. Here N is
some finite non-empty index set.
For every subset R of N, we denote by XR the tuple of
variables (with one component for each r ∈ R) that takes va-
lues in the Cartesian productXR :=×r∈RXr. The elements
ofXR are generically denoted by xR or zR, with correspon-
ding components xr := xR(r) or zr := zR(r), r ∈ R.
We will assume that the variables Xn are logically inde-
pendent, which means that for each subset R of N, XR may
assume all values inXR.
We denote by G (XR) the set of gambles defined on XR.
We will frequently resort to the simplifying device of iden-
tifying a gamble onXR with a gamble onXN , namely its
cylindrical extension. To give an example, ifK ⊆ G (XN),
this trick allows us to consider K ∩ G (XR) as the set
of those gambles in K that depend only on the variable
XR. As another example, this device allows us to identify
the gambles I{xR} and I{xR}×XN\R , and therefore also the
events {xR} and {xR}×XN\R. More generally, for any
event A⊆XR, we can identify the gambles IA and IA×XN\R ,
and therefore also the events A and A×XN\R.
We draw attention to the case R = /0. By definition, X /0
contains only one element x /0: the empty map /0→ /0. There
is no uncertainty about the value of the variable X/0: it can
assume only one value (the empty map), and IX /0 = I{x /0} =
1. We can identify G (X /0) with the set of real numbers R.
There is only one coherent set of desirable gambles onX /0:
the set R>0 of positive real numbers.
4 Marginalisation and cylindrical extension
Suppose that we have a set DN ⊆ G (XN) of desirable
gambles modelling a subject’s information about the un-
certain variable XN . We are interested in modelling the
information about the variable XO, where O is some subset
of N. This can be done using the set of desirable gambles
that belong to DN but only depend on the variable XO:
margO(DN) := {g ∈ G (XO) : g ∈DN}=DN ∩G (XO)
(3)
is called a marginal set of desirable gambles [7]. Observe
that marg /0(DN) = G (X /0)>0, which can be identified with
the set of positive real numbersR>0. Also, with O1,O2⊆N,
it is obvious that
O1 ⊆ O2⇒margO1(margO2(DN)) = margO1(DN). (4)
Coherence is trivially preserved under marginalisation:
Proposition 6. Let DN be a set of desirable gambles on
XN , and consider any subset O of N.
(i) If DN avoids non-positivity, then so does margO(DN).
(ii) If DN is coherent, then margO(DN) is a coherent set
of desirable gambles onXO.
We now look for a kind of inverse operation to margina-
lisation. Suppose we have a coherent set DO ⊆ G (XO)
of desirable gambles modelling a subject’s information
about the uncertain variable XO, and we want to extend
this to a coherent set of desirable gambles on XN , repre-
senting the same information. So we are looking for a
coherent set of desirable gambles DN ⊆ G (XN) such that
margO(DN) =DO and that is as small as possible: the most
conservative coherent set of desirable gambles onXN that
marginalises to DO.
Proposition 7. Let O be a subset of N and let DO ∈
D(XO). Then the most conservative (smallest) coherent
set of desirable gambles onXN that marginalises to DO is
given by
extN(DO) := posi(G (XN)>0∪DO). (5)
It is called the cylindrical extension of DO to a set of desi-
rable gambles onXN , and satisfies
margO(extN(DO)) =DO. (6)
This extension is called weak extension by Moral [7, Sec-
tion 2.1].
Proof. It is clear from the coherence requirements and Eq. (3) that
any coherent set that marginalises to DO must include G (XN)>0
andDO, and therefore also posi(G (XN)>0∪DO) = extN(DO). It
therefore suffices to prove that posi(G (XN)>0∪DO) is coherent,
and that it marginalises to DO.
To prove coherence, it suffices to prove that DO avoids non-
positivity, by Theorem 1. But this is obvious because DO is a
coherent set of desirable gambles onXO.
We are left to prove that margO(extN(DO)) = DO. Since for
any g ∈ DO it is obvious that both g ∈ extN(DO) and g ∈
G (XO), we see immediately that DO ⊆ margO(extN(DO)), so
we concentrate on proving that margO(extN(DO))⊆DO. Consi-
der f ∈ margO(extN(DO)), meaning that both f ∈ G (XO) and
f ∈ extN(DO). The latter means that there are g ∈ DO, h ∈
G (XN)>0, and non-negative λ and µ such that max{λ ,µ}> 0
for which f = λg+ µh. Since we need to prove that f ∈ DO,
we can assume without loss of generality that µ > 0. But then
h = ( f − λg)/µ ∈ G (XO) and therefore also h ∈ G (XO)>0,
whence indeed f ∈DO, by coherence of DO. 
5 Conditioning
Suppose that we have a set DN ⊆ G (XN) of desirable
gambles modelling a subject’s information about the un-
certain variable XN . Consider a subset I of N, and assume
we want to update the model DN with the information that
XI = xI . This leads to an updated set of desirable gambles:
DN |xI :=
{
f ∈ G (XN) : I{xI} f ∈DN
}
. (7)
For technical reasons, and mainly in order to streamline the
proofs as much as possible, we also allow the admittedly
pathological case that I = /0. Since I{x /0} = 1, this amounts
to not conditioning at all.
Eq. (7) introduces the conditioning operator ‘|’ essentially
used by Walley [9] and Moral [7]. We prefer a slightly
modified version ‘c’ [4]. Since I{xI} f = I{xI} f (xI , ·), we
can characterise the updated model DN |xI through the set
DNcxI :=
{
g ∈ G (XN\I) : I{xI}g ∈DN
}⊆ G (XN\I),
in the specific sense that for all g ∈ G (XN\I):
g ∈DNcxI ⇔ I{xI}g ∈DN ⇔ I{xI}g ∈DN |xI , (8)
and for all f ∈ G (XN): f ∈DN |xI⇔ f (xI , ·) ∈DNcxI . Co-
herence is trivially preserved under conditioning:
Proposition 8. Let DN be a coherent set of desirable
gambles on XN , and consider any subset I of N. Then
DNcxI is a coherent set of desirable gambles onXN\I .
The order of marginalisation and conditioning can be rever-
sed, under some conditions.
Proposition 9. Let DN be a coherent set of desirable
gambles on XN , and consider any disjoint subsets I and
O of N. Then margO(DNcxI) = margI∪O(DN)cxI for all
xI ∈XI .
Proof. Consider any h∈ G (XN) and observe the following chain
of equivalences:
h ∈margO(DNcxI)⇔ h ∈ G (XO) and h ∈DNcxI
⇔ h ∈ G (XO) and I{xI}h ∈DN
⇔ h ∈ G (XO) and I{xI}h ∈margI∪O(DN)
⇔ h ∈ G (XO) and h ∈margI∪O(DN)cxI
⇔ h ∈margI∪O(DN)cxI . 
6 Irrelevant natural extension
We are now ready to look at the simplest type of irrelevance
judgement. Consider two disjoint subsets I and O of N. We
say that XI is epistemically irrelevant to XO when learning
the value of XI does not influence or change our subject’s
beliefs about XO.
When does a set DN of desirable gambles onXN capture
this type of epistemic irrelevance? Observing that XI = xI
turns DN into the updated set DNcxI of desirable gambles
onXN\I , we should clearly require that:
margO(DNcxI) = margO(DN) for all xI ∈XI . (9)
As before, for technical reasons we also allow I and O
to be empty. It is clear from the definition above that the
‘variable’ X/0, about whose constant value we are certain, is
epistemically irrelevant to any variable XO. Similarly, we
see that any variable XI is epistemically irrelevant to the
‘variable’ X/0. This seems to be in accordance with intuition.
The epistemic irrelevance condition can be formulated tri-
vially in an interesting and slightly different manner.
Proposition 10. Let DN be a coherent set of desirable
gambles onXN , and let I and O be any disjoint subsets of
N. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) margO(DNcxI) = margO(DN) for all xI ∈XI;
(ii) for all f ∈ G (XO) and all xI ∈XI: I{xI} f ∈ DN ⇔
f ∈DN .
Irrelevance assessments are most useful in constructing sets
of desirable gambles from other ones. Suppose we have
a coherent set DO of desirable gambles on XO, and an
assessment that XI is epistemically irrelevant to XO, where I
and O are disjoint index sets. Then how can we combineDO
and this structural irrelevance assessment into a coherent
set of desirable gambles on XI∪O, or more generally, on
XN , where N ⊇ I ∪O? To see how this can be done in a
way that is as conservative as possible, we introduce:
A irrI→O := posi
({
I{xI}g : g ∈DO and xI ∈XI
})
.
It follows from the next lemma that for all h ∈ G (XI∪O):
h ∈A irrI→O⇔ h 6= 0 and (∀xI ∈XI)h(xI , ·) ∈DO∪{0}.
(10)
Clearly, and this will be quite important in streamlining
proofs, A irr/0→O =DO and A
irr
I→ /0 = G (XI)>0. We also give
two important properties of these sets:
Lemma 11. Consider disjoint subsets I and O of N, and a
coherent set DO of desirable gambles onXO. Then A irrI→O
is a coherent set of desirable gambles onXI∪O.
Proof. D1. Assume ex absurdo that there are n > 0, real λk >
0 and fk ∈ A irrI→O such that ∑nk=1 λk fk = 0. It follows from the
assumptions that there are ` ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and xI ∈XI such that
f`(xI , ·) 6= 0. This implies that in the sum ∑nk=1 λk fk(xI , ·) = 0
not all the gambles λk fk(xI , ·) are zero. Since the non-zero ones
belong to DO, this contradicts the coherence of DO.
D2. Consider any h ∈ G (XI∪O)>0. Then clearly h(xI , ·)≥ 0 and
therefore h(xI , ·) ∈DO∪{0} for all xI ∈XI . Since h 6= 0, it fol-
lows that indeed h ∈A irrI→O.
D3. Trivial if we recall that posi(posi(D)) = posi(D) for any set
of desirable gambles D. 
Lemma 12. Consider disjoint subsets I and O of N, and
a coherent set DO of desirable gambles on XO. Then
margO(A
irr
I→O) =DO.
Proof. It is obvious from Eq. (10) that indeed:
margO(A
irr
I→O) =A
irr
I→O∩G (XO)
=
{
h ∈ G (XO)6=0 : (∀xI ∈XI)h ∈DO∪{0}
}
=
{
h ∈ G (XO)6=0 : h ∈DO∪{0}
}
=DO. 
Theorem 13. Consider disjoint subsets I and O of N, and
a coherent set DO of desirable gambles on XO. Then
the smallest coherent set of desirable gambles on XN
that marginalises to DO and satisfies the epistemic irrele-
vance condition (9) of XI to XO is given by extN(A irrI→O) =
posi(G (XN)>0∪A irrI→O).
Proof. Consider any coherent set DN on XN that margina-
lises to DO and satisfies the irrelevance condition (9). This im-
plies that margO(DNcxI) = DO for any xI ∈XI , so g ∈ DNcxI ,
and therefore I{xI}g ∈ DN for any g ∈ DO, by Eq. (8). So we
infer by coherence that A irrI→O ⊆ DN , and therefore also that
posi(G (XN)>0 ∪A irrI→O) ⊆ DN . As a consequence, it suffices
to prove that (i) extN(A irrI→O) is coherent, (ii) marginalises to DO,
and (iii) satisfies the epistemic irrelevance condition (9). This is
what we now set out to do.
(i). By Lemma 11,A irrI→O is a coherent set of desirable gambles on
XI∪O, so Proposition 7 implies that posi(G (XN)>0∪A irrI→O) =
extN(A irrI→O) is a coherent set of desirable gambles onXN .
(ii). Marginalisation leads to:
margO(extN(A
irr
I→O)) = margO(margI∪O(extN(A
irr
I→O)))
= margO(A
irr
I→O) =DO,
where the first equality follows from Eq. (4), the second from
Eq. (6), and the third from Lemma 12.
(iii). It follows from Proposition 9 and Eq. (6) that
margO(extN(A
irr
I→O)cxI) = margI∪O(extN(A irrI→O))cxI
=A irrI→OcxI ,
and we have just shown in (ii) that margO(extN(A
irr
I→O)) = DO,
so proving that margO(extN(A
irr
I→O)cxI) = margO(extN(A irrI→O))
amounts to proving that A irrI→OcxI = DO. It is obvious from the
definition of A irrI→O that DO ⊆ A irrI→OcxI , so we concentrate on
the converse inclusion. Consider any h ∈A irrI→OcxI ; then I{xI}h ∈
A irrI→O, so we infer from Eq. (10) that in particular h ∈DO∪{0}.
But since A irrI→O is coherent by Lemma 11, we see that h 6= 0 and
therefore indeed h ∈DO. 
Theorem 13 is mentioned briefly, with only a hint at the
proof, by Moral [7, Section 2.4]. We believe the result is not
so trivial and have therefore decided to include our version
of the proof here. Our notion of epistemic irrelevance is
called weak epistemic irrelevance by Moral. For his ver-
sion of epistemic irrelevance he requires in addition that
DN should be equal to the irrelevant natural extension of
DO, and therefore be the smallest model that satisfies the
(weak) epistemic irrelevance condition (9). While we feel
comfortable with his reasons for doing so, we have decided
not to follow his lead in this.
7 Independent natural extension
We now turn to independence assessments, which consti-
tute a symmetrisation of irrelevance assessments. We say
that the variables Xn,n ∈ N are epistemically independent
when learning the values of any number of them does not
influence or change our beliefs about the remaining ones:
for any two disjoint subsets I and O of N, XI is epistemically
irrelevant to XO.
When does a set DN of desirable gambles onXN capture
this type of epistemic independence?
Definition 2. A coherent set DN of desirable gambles on
XN is called independent if
margO(DNcxI) = margO(DN)
for all disjoint I,O⊆ N, and all xI ∈XI .
In this definition, we allow I and O to be empty too, but
doing so does not lead to any substantive requirement, be-
cause the condition margO(DNcxI) = margO(DN) is tri-
vially satisfied when I or O are empty.
Independent sets have an interesting factorisation property
(see Ref. [3] for another paper where factorisation is consi-
dered in this somewhat unusual form).
Proposition 14 (Factorisation). Let DN be an inde-
pendent coherent set of desirable gambles onXN . Then for
all disjoint subsets I and O of N and for all f ∈ G (XO):
f ∈DN ⇔ (∀g ∈ G (XI)>0) f g ∈DN . (11)
Proof. Fix arbitrary disjoint subsets I and O of N and any f ∈
G (XO); we show that Eq. (11) holds. The ‘⇐’ part is trivial. For
the ‘⇒’ part, assume that f ∈DN and consider any g ∈ G (XI)>0.
We have to show that f g ∈DN . Since g = ∑xI∈XI I{xI}g(xI), we
see that f g = ∑xI∈XI g(xI)I{xI} f . Now since f ∈ margO(DN),
we infer from the independence of DN and the assumption (i)
in Proposition 10 that f ∈DNcxI and therefore I{xI} f ∈DN for
all xI ∈XI . We conclude that f g is a positive linear combina-
tion of elements I{xI} f of DN , and therefore belongs to DN by
coherence. 
Independence assessments are useful in constructing joint
sets of desirable gambles from marginal ones. Suppose
we have coherent sets Dn of desirable gambles onXn, for
each n ∈ N and an assessment that the variables Xn, n ∈ N
are epistemically independent. Then how can we combine
the Dn and this structural independence assessment into a
coherent set of desirable gambles onXN in a way that is
as conservative as possible? If we call independent product
of the Dn any independent DN ∈ D(XN) that marginalises
to the Dn for all n ∈ N, this means we are looking for the
smallest such independent product.
Further on, we are going to prove that such a smallest in-
dependent product always exists. Before we can do this
elegantly, however, we need to do some preparatory work
involving particular sets of desirable gambles that can be
constructed from the Dn. Consider, as a special case of
Eq. (10), for any subset I of N and any o ∈ N \ I:
A irrI→{o} := posi
({
I{xI}g : g ∈Do and xI ∈XI
})
It is again easy to see that for all h ∈ G (XI∪{o}):
h ∈A irrI→{o}⇔ h 6= 0 and (∀xI ∈XI)h(xI , ·) ∈Do∪{0}.
(12)
We use these sets to construct the following set of desirable
gambles onXN :
⊗n∈NDn := posi
(
G (XN)>0∪
⋃
n∈N
A irrN\{n}→{n}
)
. (13)
Observe that, quite trivially, A irr{n}\{n}→{n} =Dn and there-
fore⊗m∈{n}Dm =Dn. We now prove a number of important
properties for ⊗n∈NDn.
Proposition 15 (Coherence). ⊗n∈NDn is a coherent set of
desirable gambles onXN .
Proof. Let, for ease of notation AN :=
⋃
n∈NA irrN\{n}→{n}. It fol-
lows from Theorem 1 that we have to prove that AN avoids non-
positivity. So consider any f ∈ posi(AN), and assume ex absurdo
that f ≤ 0. Then there are λn ≥ 0 and fn ∈A irrN\{n}→{n} such that
f = ∑n∈N λn fn and maxn∈N λn > 0 [recall that the A irrN\{n}→{n}
are convex cones, by Lemma 11]. Fix arbitrary m ∈ N. Let
A Nm :=
{
fm(xN\{m}, ·) : xN\{m} ∈XN\{m}, fm(xN\{m}, ·) 6= 0
}
,
then it follows from Eq. (12) thatA Nm is a finite non-empty subset
of Dm, so the coherence of Dm, Theorem 1 and Lemma 2 imply
that there is some mass function pm on Xm with expectation
operator Em such that (∀xm ∈Xm)pm(xm)> 0 and
(∀xN\{m} ∈XN\{m})
( fm(xN\{m}, ·) 6= 0⇒ Em( fm(xN\{m}, ·))> 0).
So if we define the gamble gN\{m} on XN\{m} by letting
gN\{m}(xN\{m}) := Em( fm(xN\{m}, ·)) for all xN\{m} ∈XN\{m},
then gN\{m} > 0.
Since we can do this for all m ∈ N, we can define the mass
function pN onXN by letting pN(xN) :=∏m∈N pm(xm)> 0 for
all xN ∈XN . The corresponding expectation operator EN is of
course the product operator of the marginals Em. But then it fol-
lows from the reasoning and assumptions above that EN( f ) =
∑m∈N λmEN( fm) = ∑m∈N λmEN(gm) > 0, whereas f ≤ 0 leads
us to conclude that EN( f )≤ 0, a contradiction. 
Lemma 16. Consider any disjoint subsets I, R of N and
any o ∈ N \ (I ∪R). Then f (xR, ·) ∈ A irrI→{o} ∪{0} for all
f ∈A irrI∪R→{o} and all xR ∈XR.
Proof. Fix f ∈A irrI∪R→{o} and xR ∈XR and consider the gamble
g := f (xR, ·) on XI∪O. It follows from the assumptions that for
all xI ∈XI , g(xI , ·) = f (xR,xI , ·) ∈Do∪{0}, whence indeed g ∈
A irrI→{o}∪{0}. 
Proposition 17 (Marginalisation). Let R be any subset of
N, then margR(⊗n∈NDn) =⊗r∈RDr.
Proof. Since we are interpreting gambles on XR as special
gambles on XN , it is clear from Eq. (12) that for any r ∈ R,
A irrR\{r}→{r} ⊆ A irrN\{r}→{r}. Eqs. (5) and (13) now tell us that
extN(⊗r∈RDr) ⊆ ⊗n∈NDn. If we invoke Eq. (6), this leads
to ⊗r∈RDr = margR(extN(⊗r∈RDr))⊆margR(⊗n∈NDn), so we
can concentrate on the converse inclusion.
Consider therefore any f ∈ margR(⊗n∈NDn) = (⊗n∈NDn) ∩
G (XR), and assume ex absurdo that f /∈ ⊗r∈RDr.
It follows from the coherence of ⊗n∈NDn [see Proposition 15]
that f 6= 0. Since f ∈⊗n∈NDn, there are S⊆ N, fs ∈A irrN\{s}→{s},
s∈ S and g∈G (XN)with g≥ 0 such that f = g+∑s∈S fs. Clearly
S\R 6= /0, because S\R = /0 would imply that, with xN\R any ele-
ment ofXN\R, f = f (xN\R, ·)= g(xN\R, ·)+∑s∈S∩R fs(xN\R, ·)∈
⊗r∈RDr, since we infer from Lemma 16 that fs(xN\R, ·) ∈
A irrR\{s}→{s}∪{0} for all s ∈ S∩R.
It follows from the coherence of ⊗r∈RDr [Proposition 15], f /∈
⊗r∈RDr and Lemma 3 that 0 /∈ posi({− f}∪⊗r∈RDr). Let, for
ease of notation, A NS∩R be the set{
fs(zN\R, ·) : s ∈ S∩R,zN\R ∈XN\R, fs(zN\R, ·) 6= 0
}
.
Then A NS∩R is clearly a finite subset of ⊗r∈RDr [to see this, use
a similar argument as above, involving Lemma 16], so we infer
from Lemma 2 that there is some mass function pR onXR with
associated expectation operator ER such that
(∀xR ∈XR)pR(xR)> 0
(∀s ∈ S∩R)(∀zN\R ∈XN\R)ER( fs(zN\R, ·))≥ 0
ER( f )< 0.
Since f = f (zN\R, ·) for any choice of zN\R inXN\R, we see that
f = g(zN\R, ·)+∑s∈S∩R fs(zN\R, ·)+∑s∈S\R fs(zN\R, ·), whence:
0> ER( f )−ER(g(zN\R, ·))− ∑
s∈S∩R
ER( fs(zN\R, ·))
= ∑
s∈S\R
ER( fs(zN\R, ·)) = ∑
s∈S\R
∑
xR∈XR
pR(xR) fs(zN\R,xR).
The gambles fs(·,xR) onXN\R, with xR ∈XR and s ∈ S\R, can
clearly not all be zero. The non-zero ones all belong to⊗s∈N\RDs,
by Lemma 16, so the coherence of the set of desirable gambles
⊗s∈N\RDs [Proposition 15] guarantees that their positive linear
combination h := ∑s∈S\R∑xR∈XR pR(xR) fs(·,xR) also belongs to⊗s∈N\RDs. This contradicts h< 0. Hence indeed f ∈ ⊗r∈RDr.
Proposition 18 (Conditioning). ⊗n∈NDn is independent:
for all disjoint subsets I and O of N, and all xI ∈XI ,
margO(⊗n∈NDncxI) = margO(⊗n∈NDn) =⊗o∈ODo.
This could probably be proved indirectly using the ‘semi-
graphoid’ properties of conditional epistemic irrelevance,
proved by Moral [7]; it appears we need reverse weak union,
reverse decomposition, and contraction. Here we give a
direct proof. Proposition 17 can also be seen as a special
case of the present result for I = /0.
Proof. Fix arbitrary disjoint subsets I and O of N, and arbitrary
xI ∈XI . The second equality follows from Proposition 17, so we
concentrate on proving that margO(⊗n∈NDncxI) =⊗o∈ODo.
We first show that ⊗o∈ODo ⊆⊗n∈NDncxI . Consider any gamble
f ∈ ⊗o∈ODo, then we have to show that I{xI} f ∈ ⊗n∈NDn. By
assumption, there are non-negative reals λo and µ , gambles
fo ∈ A irrO\{o}→{o} for all o ∈ O and g ∈ G (XO)>0 such that
f = µg+∑o∈O λo fo and max{µ,maxo∈O λo} > 0. Fix o ∈ O
and let f ′o := I{xI} fo ∈ G (XN). Then it follows from the defi-
nition of A irrO\{o}→{o} that f
′
o(zN\{o}, ·) = I{xI}(zI) fo(zO\{o}, ·) ∈
Do ∪{0} for all zN\{o} ∈XN\{o}. Since f ′o 6= 0, the definition
of A irrN\{o}→{o} tells us that f
′
o ∈A irrN\{o}→{o}. Similarly, if we let
g′ := I{xI}g ∈ G (XN), then g′ > 0. So it follows from Eq. (13)
that indeed I{xI} f = µg
′+∑o∈O λo f ′o ∈ ⊗n∈NDn.
We now turn to the converse inclusion ⊗n∈NDncxI ⊆ ⊗o∈ODo.
Consider any gamble f ∈ G (XO) such that I{xI} f belongs to
⊗n∈NDn and assume ex absurdo that f /∈ ⊗o∈ODo. Let, for the
sake of notational simplicity, C := N \ (I∪O).
It follows from the coherence of ⊗n∈NDn [Proposition 15] that
f 6= 0. Since I{xI} f ∈⊗n∈NDn, there are S⊆N, fs ∈A irrN\{s}→{s},
s ∈ S and g ∈ G (XN) with g≥ 0 such that I{xI} f = g+∑s∈S fs.
Clearly S\O 6= /0, because S\O= /0 would imply that, with xC any
element ofXC, f = g(xI ,xC, ·)+∑s∈S∩O fs(xI ,xC, ·) ∈ ⊗o∈ODo,
because fs(xI ,xC, ·) ∈A irrO\{s}→{s} for all s ∈ S∩O by Lemma 16.
It follows from the coherence of ⊗o∈ODo [Proposition 15], f /∈
⊗o∈ODo and Lemma 3 that 0 /∈ posi({− f}∪⊗o∈ODo). The set
A NS∩O := { fs(xI ,zC, ·) : s ∈ S∩O,zC ∈XC, fs(xI ,zC, ·) 6= 0}
is clearly a finite subset of ⊗o∈ODo [use Lemma 16 again], so we
infer from Lemma 2 that there is some mass function pO onXO
with associated expectation operator EO such that
(∀xO ∈XO)pO(xO)> 0
(∀s ∈ S∩O)(∀zC ∈XC)EO( fs(xI ,zC, ·))≥ 0
EO( f )< 0.
Since f = g(xI ,zC, ·)+∑s∈S∩O fs(xI ,zC, ·)+∑s∈S\O fs(xI ,zC, ·)
for any choice of zC ∈XC, we see that:
0> EO( f )−EO(g(xI ,zC, ·))− ∑
s∈S∩O
EO( fs(xI ,zC, ·))
= ∑
s∈S\O
EO( fs(xI ,zC, ·)) = ∑
s∈S\O
∑
xO∈XO
pO(xO) fs(xI ,zC,xO).
Similarly, for any zC ∈XC and any zI ∈XI \{xI} we infer from
0 = g(zI ,zC, ·)+∑s∈S∩O fs(zI ,zC, ·)+∑s∈S\O fs(zI ,zC, ·) that:
0≥−EO(g(zI ,zC, ·))− ∑
s∈S∩O
EO( fs(zI ,zC, ·))
= ∑
s∈S\O
EO( fs(zI ,zC, ·)) = ∑
s∈S\O
∑
xO∈XO
pO(xO) fs(zI ,zC,xO).
Hence h := ∑s∈S\O∑xO∈XO pO(xO) fs(·, ·,xO)< 0. The gambles
fs(·, ·,xO) on XI∪C, with xO ∈ XO and s ∈ S \O, can clearly
not all be zero. The non-zero ones all belong to ⊗s∈I∪CDs, by
Lemma 16. But then the coherence of the set of desirable gambles
⊗s∈I∪CDs [Proposition 15] guarantees that their positive linear
combination h is an element of⊗c∈CDc for which h< 0, a contra-
diction. Hence indeed f ∈ ⊗o∈ODo. 
Theorem 19 (Independent natural extension).
⊗n∈NDn is the smallest coherent set of desirable
gambles on XN that is an independent product of the
coherent sets Dn of desirable gambles onXn, n ∈ N.
We call ⊗n∈NDn the independent natural extension of the
marginals Dn.
Proof. It follows from Propositions 15, 17 and 18 that ⊗n∈NDn
is an independent product DN of the Dn. To prove that it
is the smallest one, consider any independent product DN of
the Dn. Fix n ∈ N. If we consider any xN\{n} ∈XN\{n}, then
margn(DNcxN\{n}) =Dn, by assumption. If we therefore consi-
der any g ∈ Dn, this in turn implies that g ∈ DNcxN\{n}, and
therefore I{xN\{n}}g ∈ DN , by Eq. (8). So we infer by coherence
thatA irrN\{n}→{n} ⊆DN , and therefore also that⊗n∈NDn ⊆DN .
Theorem 20 (Associativity). Let N1,N2 be disjoint non-
empty index sets, and let Dnk ∈ D(Xnk), nk ∈ Nk, k = 1,2.
Then ⊗n∈N1∪N2Dn = (⊗n1∈N1Dn1)⊗ (⊗n2∈N2Dn2).
Proof. Consider, for ease of notation, DN1 := ⊗n1∈N1Dn1 and
DN2 := ⊗n2∈N2Dn2 . We have to prove that DN1 ⊗ DN2 =
⊗n∈N1∪N2Dn.
We first prove that DN1 ⊗DN2 ⊆ ⊗n∈N1∪N2Dn. Fix any gamble
h ∈ A irr{N1}→{N2} and any xN1 ∈ XN1 , so h(xN1 , ·) ∈ DN2 ∪ {0}
by Eq. (12). It follows from Eq. (13) that there are gambles
hn2xN1 ∈A irrN2\{n2}→{n2} ∪{0} for all n2 ∈ N2 such that h(xN1 , ·)≥
∑n2∈N2 h
n2
xN1 . Define, for any n2 ∈ N2, the gamble gn2 on XN by
letting gn2(xN\{n2}, ·) := hn2xN1 (xN2\{n2}, ·) for all xN ∈XN . Then
it follows from Eq. (12) that gn2(xN\{n2}, ·) ∈ Dn2 ∪{0} for all
xN ∈XN , and therefore gn2 ∈A irrN\{n2}→{n2}∪{0}. Moreover,
h = ∑
xN1∈XN1
I{xN1}h(xN1 , ·)≥ ∑
xN1∈XN1
I{xN1} ∑
n2∈N2
hn2xN1
= ∑
n2∈N2
∑
xN1∈XN1
I{xN1}h
n2
xN1
= ∑
n2∈N2
gn2 ,
Since clearly h 6= 0, we infer from Eq. (13) that h ∈ ⊗n∈N1∪N2Dn.
We conclude that A irr{N1}→{N2} ⊆⊗n∈N1∪N2Dn. Similarly, we can
prove the inclusion A irr{N2}→{N1} ⊆ ⊗n∈N1∪N2Dn, and therefore
also DN1 ⊗DN2 ⊆⊗n∈N1∪N2Dn, again by Eq. (13).
To conclude, we turn to the converse inclusion ⊗n∈N1∪N2Dn ⊆
DN1 ⊗DN2 . Consider any gamble h ∈ ⊗n∈N1∪N2Dn, then by
Eq. (13) there are hn ∈ A irrN1∪N2\{n}→{n} ∪ {0}, n ∈ N1 ∪ N2,
such that h ≥ h1 + h2, where we let h1 := ∑n1∈N1 hn1 and h2 :
= ∑n2∈N2 hn2 . Fix any xN1 ∈XN1 . For any n2 ∈ N2, we infer that
hn2(xN1 , ·)∈A irrN2\{n2}→{n2}∪{0} from hn2 ∈A irrN1∪N2\{n2}→{n2}∪
{0} by Lemma 16. Hence h2(xN1 , ·) ∈ DN2 ∪ {0} by Eq. (13),
and therefore h2 ∈ A irr{N1}→{N2} ∪ {0} by Eq. (12). Similarly,
h1 ∈A irr{N2}→{N1}∪{0}, and therefore h∈DN1⊗DN2 by Eq. (13),
since clearly h 6= 0. 
To conclude this section, we establish a connection bet-
ween independent natural extension for sets of desirable
gambles and the eponymous notion for coherent lower pre-
visions studied in detail in Ref. [3]. Given coherent lower
previsions Pn on G (Xn), n ∈ N, their independent natural
extension is the coherent lower prevision given by
EN( f ) :=
sup
hn∈G (XN)
n∈N
min
zN∈XN
[
f (zN)−∑
n∈N
[hn(zN)−Pn(hn(·,zN\{n}))]
]
(14)
for all gambles f onXN . It is the point-wise smallest (most
conservative) joint lower prevision that is jointly coherent
with the marginals Pn given an assessment of epistemic
independence of the variables Xn, n ∈ N.
Theorem 21. LetDn be coherent sets of desirable gambles
onXn for n ∈ N, and let ⊗n∈NDn be their independent na-
tural extension. Consider the coherent lower previsions Pn
on G (Xn) given by Pn( fn) := sup{µ ∈ R : fn−µ ∈Dn}
for all fn ∈G (Xn). Then the independent natural extension
EN of the marginal lower previsions Pn, n ∈ N satisfies
EN( f ) = sup{µ ∈ R : f −µ ∈ ⊗n∈NDn}
for all gambles f onXN .
Proof. Fix any gamble f in G (XN). First, consider any real
number µ < EN( f ), then it follows from Eq. (14) that there
are δ > 0 and hn ∈ G (XN), n ∈ N, such that f − µ ≥ ∑n∈N gn,
where we defined the gambles gn onXN by gn(zN) := hn(zN)−
Pn(hn(zN\{n}, ·))+δ for all zN ∈XN . It follows from the defini-
tion of Pn that gn(zN\{n}, ·) = hn(zN\{n}, ·)−Pn(hn(zN\{n}, ·))+
δ ∈ Dn for all zN\{n} ∈XN\{n}. Since clearly gn 6= 0, Eq. (12)
then tells us that gn ∈A irrN\{n}→{n}, and we infer from Eq. (13) that
∑n∈N gn ∈ ⊗n∈NDn, and therefore also f − µ ∈ ⊗n∈NDn. This
guarantees that EN( f )≤ sup{µ ∈ R : f −µ ∈ ⊗n∈NDn}.
To prove the converse inequality, consider any real µ such that
f −µ ∈ ⊗n∈NDn. We infer using Eq. (13) that there are gambles
hn ∈ A irrN\{n}→{n} ∪ {0}, n ∈ N, such that f − µ ≥ ∑n∈N hn.
For all n ∈ N and zN\{n} ∈ XN\{n}, it follows from Eq. (12)
that hn(zN\{n}, ·) ∈ Dn ∪ {0}, whence Pn(hn(zN\{n}, ·)) ≥ 0.
This leads to ∑n∈N [hn(zN)−Pn(hn(zN\{n}, ·))]≤∑n∈N hn(zN)≤
f (zN)−µ . We then infer from Eq. (14) that EN( f )≥ µ and so we
find that indeed also EN( f )≥ sup{µ ∈ R : f −µ ∈ ⊗n∈NDn}.
8 Maximal sets of desirable gambles and
strong products
The following result was (essentially) proved in Ref. [1].
Proposition 22. LetMN ∈M(XN), and consider any dis-
joint subsets I and O of N. Then margO(MNcxI)∈M(XO)
for all xI ∈XI .
Now consider the case where we have coherent marginal
sets of desirable gambles Dn for all n ∈ N. We define their
strong product n∈NDn as the set of desirable gambles on
the product spaceXN given by:
n∈NDn :=
⋂
{⊗n∈NMn : Mn ∈ m(Dn),n ∈ N}
Observe that for maximal sets Mn ∈M(Xn), n ∈ N the
strong product and the independent natural extension coin-
cide: n∈NMn =⊗n∈NMn.
The marginalisation properties of the strong product follow
from those of the independent natural extension.
Proposition 23 (Marginalisation). Consider coherent
sets of desirable gambles Dn for all n ∈ N. Let R be any
subset of N, then margR(n∈NDn) =r∈RDr.
Proof. Consider any f ∈ G (XR) and observe the following chain
of equivalences:
f ∈n∈NDn⇔ (∀Mn ∈ m(Dn),n ∈ N) f ∈ ⊗n∈NMn
⇔ (∀Mn ∈ m(Dn),n ∈ N) f ∈ ⊗r∈RMr
⇔ (∀Mr ∈ m(Dr),r ∈ R) f ∈ ⊗r∈RMr
⇔ f ∈r∈RDr,
where the second equivalence follows from Proposition 17. 
As we have come to expect from our treatment of the in-
dependent natural extension, the proof of the following
independence property is very similar to that of the margi-
nalisation property.
Proposition 24. Consider coherent sets of desirable
gambles Dn for all n ∈ N. Then their strong product
n∈NDn is an independent product of these marginals.
Proof. Consider any disjoint subsets I and O of N, and any
xI ∈XI , then it suffices to prove that, also using Proposition 23,
margO(n∈NDncxI) = o∈ODo. So consider any gamble f on
XO and observe the following chain of equivalences:
f ∈n∈NDncxI ⇔ I{xI} f ∈n∈NDn
⇔ (∀Mn ∈ m(Dn),n ∈ N)I{xI} f ∈ ⊗n∈NMn
⇔ (∀Mn ∈ m(Dn),n ∈ N) f ∈ ⊗o∈OMo
⇔ (∀Mo ∈ m(Do),o ∈ O) f ∈ ⊗o∈OMo
⇔ f ∈o∈ODo,
where the third equivalence follows from Proposition 18. 
It is still an open problem at this point whether, like the
natural extension, the strong product is associative.
To conclude this section, we establish a connection between
the strong product of sets of desirable gambles and the
eponymous notion for coherent lower previsions, studied
in Ref. [3]. Given coherent lower previsions Pn on G (Xn),
n ∈ N, their strong product is defined by
SN( f ) := inf{×n∈NPn( f ) : (∀n ∈ N)Pn ∈M (Pn)}
for all gambles f onXN . If we start from linear previsions
Pn on G (Xn), their strong product corresponds to their
linear product ×n∈NPn, and it coincides also with their in-
dependent natural extension EN . If we begin with coherent
lower previsions Pn on G (Xn), their strong product SN is
the lower envelope of the set of strong products determined
by the dominating linear previsions.
Theorem 25. LetDn be coherent sets of desirable gambles
in G (Xn) for all n ∈ N, and let n∈NDn be their strong
product. Consider the coherent lower previsions Pn on
G (Xn) given by Pn( f ) := sup{µ ∈ R : f −µ ∈Dn}. Then
the strong product SN of the marginal lower previsions Pn,
n ∈ N satisfies SN( f ) = sup{µ ∈ R : f −µ ∈n∈NDn}.
Proof. Assume first of all that Dn is a maximal set of desirable
gambles for all n in N. Then it follows from Theorem 3.8.3 in
Ref. [8] that Pn is a linear prevision, which we denote by Pn, for
all n ∈ N. The strong product of the linear previsions Pn, n ∈ N
coincides with their linear independent product ×n∈NPn, which
is also their independent natural extension, by Proposition 10 in
Ref. [3]. Since we have proved in Theorem 21 that this is the
coherent lower prevision associated with ⊗n∈NDn = n∈NDn,
we conclude that the strong product n∈NDn is associated with
the strong product of the linear previsions Pn.
Next, fix any gamble f on XN . Consider any real number µ <
SN( f ). For any n ∈ N, consider any maximal set Mn ∈ m(Dn),
and the associated linear prevision Pn, then clearly Pn ∈M (Pn).
Hence ×n∈NPn( f ) ≥ SN( f ) > µ , and we infer from the argu-
ments above that then necessarily f − µ ∈ ⊗n∈NMn. Hence
f − µ ∈ n∈NDn. This leads to the conclusion that SN( f ) ≤
sup{µ ∈ R : f −µ ∈n∈NDn}.
Conversely, consider any real µ such that f −µ ∈n∈NDn. Consi-
der arbitrary Pn ∈M (Pn), n ∈ N, then there are maximal sets
Mn ∈ m(Dn) inducing them: indeed, the set of strictly desirable
gamblesD
′
n that induces Pn, given by Eq. (2), is coherent by Theo-
rem 3.8.1 in Ref. [8]; Theorem 5 implies that there is some maxi-
mal setMn ∈m(D ′n)⊇m(Dn), and now Theorem 3.8.3 in Ref. [8]
implies that D
′
n andMn induce the same Pn by means of Eq. (1).
But then f −µ ∈⊗n∈NMn, and therefore ×n∈NPn( f )≥ µ , using
the argumentation above. Hence SN( f ) ≥ µ , and therefore also
SN( f )≥ sup{µ ∈ R : f −µ ∈n∈NDn}. 
Together with Theorem 21 and the fact that the strong pro-
duct of lower previsions may strictly dominate their inde-
pendent natural extension [see Example 9.3.4 in Ref. [8]],
this shows that the strong product of marginal sets of desi-
rable gambles may strictly include their independent natural
extension.
9 Conditional irrelevance and
independence
We turn to conditional irrelevance judgements. Next to the
variables XN inXN , we now also consider another variable
Y assuming values in a finite set Y .
Consider two disjoint subsets I and O of N. We say that XI
is epistemically irrelevant to XO when, conditional on Y ,
learning the value of XI does not influence or change our
beliefs about XO. In order for a set D of desirable gambles
onXN ×Y to capture this type of conditional epistemic
irrelevance, we should require that:
margO(DcxI ,y) = margO(Dcy) ∀xI ∈XI ,y ∈ Y .
As before, for technical reasons we also allow I and O
to be empty. It is clear from the definition above that the
‘variable’ X/0, about whose constant value we are certain,
is conditionally epistemically irrelevant to any variable
XO. Similarly, we see that any variable XI is conditionally
epistemically irrelevant to the ‘variable’ X/0. This seems to
be in accordance with intuition.
Also, if Y is a singleton, then there is no uncertainty about
Y and conditioning on Y amounts to not conditioning at
all: epistemic irrelevance can be seen as a special case of
conditional epistemic irrelevance. We now want to argue
that, conversely, there is a very specific and definite way
in which conditional epistemic irrelevance statements can
be reduced to simple epistemic irrelevance statements. The
crucial results that allow us to establish this, are the follo-
wing conceptually very simple theorem and its corollary.
Theorem 26 (Sequential updating). Consider any subset
R of N, and any coherent set D of desirable gambles on
XN×Y . Then
(Dcy)cxR = (DcxR)cy =DcxR,y
for all xR ∈XR and y ∈ Y . (15)
Proof. Fix any xR in XR and any y ∈ Y . Clearly, all three sets
in Eq. (15) are subsets of G (XN\R). So take any gamble f on
XN\R, and consider the following chains of equivalences:
I{y}I{xR} f ∈D⇔ I{xR} f ∈Dcy⇔ f ∈ (Dcy)cxR
I{y}I{xR} f ∈D⇔ I{y} f ∈DcxR⇔ f ∈ (DcxR)cy
I{y}I{xR} f ∈D⇔ f ∈DcxR,y. 
Corollary 27 (Reduction). Consider any disjoint subsets
I and O of N, and any coherent set D of desirable gambles
onXN×Y . Then the following statements are equivalent:
(i) margO(DcxI ,y) = margO(Dcy) for all xI ∈XI and
all y ∈ Y ;
(ii) margO((Dcy)cxI) = margO(Dcy) for all xI ∈XI and
all y ∈ Y .
This tells us that a model D about (XN ,Y ) captures episte-
mic irrelevance of XI to XO, conditional on Y if and only if
for each possible value y ∈ Y of Y , the model Dcy about
XN captures epistemic irrelevance of XI to XO.
Now suppose we have marginal conditional models DncY
on Xn, n ∈ N. The notation DncY is a concise way of
representing the family of conditional models Dncy, y ∈Y .
Then if we combine Corollary 27 and Theorem 19, we see
that the smallest conditionally independent product DcY
of these marginal models DncY is given by ⊗n∈N(DncY ),
meaning that for each y ∈ Y , Dcy =⊗n∈N(Dncy).
10 Conclusions
Sets of desirable gambles are more informative than co-
herent lower previsions, and they are helpful in avoiding
problems involving zero probabilities. They have been over-
looked for much of the development of the theory, and it
is only in the last five or six years that more effort is being
devoted to bringing this simplifying and unifying notion to
the fore.
Our results here show that we can model assessments
of epistemic independence easily using sets of desirable
gambles, and that we can derive from them existing results
for lower previsions.
They also indicate that constructing global joint models
(i.e. coherent sets of desirable gambles) from local ones is
something that can be easily and efficiently done for the
following types of simple credal networks:
. . .
They may therefore open up the way towards finding effi-
cient algorithms for inference in credal trees under episte-
mic irrelevance using sets of desirable gambles as uncer-
tainty models, building on the ideas proposed in Ref. [2].
We expect that generalising those algorithms towards more
general credal networks (polytrees, . . . ) will be more diffi-
cult, and will have to rely heavily on the pioneering work of
Moral [7] on graphoid properties for epistemic irrelevance.
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